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RIGHTS OF A TEACHER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
WHEN SCHOOL IS CLOSED
This problem presents a nice question in contract law and
one upon which very little has been written. Without doubt
this phase of contract law is highly practical from the lawyer's
standpoint, and may come up at any time, since thousands of
contracts are executed between school authorities and school
teachers every year. The writer will attempt to detail the
rights of a teacher under his contract in the following instances:
(1) When school is closed by order of the school 'authorities
themselves because of an epidemic or inclement weather; (2)
When school is closed by order of the health authorities because
of the prevalence of disease or bad weather; (3) When school is
closed because of destruction of the school building. These situations will be discussed in the order given.
Before beginning the discussion proper perhaps it would
be well to indulge in a few assumptions. First let us assume
that the teacher is qualified to teach under the law, and that he
is working under a valid contract of employment. In addition
to certainty and definiteness required by general contract law,
to be valid a teacher's contract with a board of education must
comply with certain statutory requisites. For instance, such
contract must not be for a duration longer than one year.' Moreover, although not coming within the Statute of Frauds such
contracts by statute and decision must be in writing in Kentucky. 2 Along with the above assumptions as to validity, let us
further assume that there is no provision in the teacher's contract for a cessation of his salary upon the happening of any
contingencies whatsoever.
1. Now, let us suppose that the school authorities themselves find it necessary or expedient to temporarily close the
s chool because of an epidemic, or inclement weather. What
rights has the teacher to his salary for the period during which
the school is thus closed?

1Cqrroll's Kentucky Statutes, Section 4399-34 (1934 Supp.).
-Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Section 4396-2 (1930 Ed.); Gover v.
Stovall 273 Ky. 172. 35 S. W. (2d) 34 (1931); Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Section 4384-30 (1934 Supp.).

K. L. J.-5
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-According to elementary principles of contract law, certain classes of impossibility excuse performance of a given contract. Impossibility, according to a noted writer on contract
law, excuses performance when the impossibility is due (1) to an
act of God; 3 (2) to a change in the law which renders performance of a contract illegal ;4 (3) to the death of one of the parties
when the contract was for personal services ;5 (4) to the destruction of the subject matter, where the contract calls for a specific thing, or specific goods, as distinguished from a general
subject matter, the promisor not having assumed the risk of the
continuance in esse of the subject matter." But it is well settled
that mere impossibility, inconvenience in performing, or hardship does not release the contracting parties from contractual
7
obligations.
Applying the rule as enunciated in the preceding paragraph, the Courts have uniformly held that where schools are
closed by the school authorities because of an epidemic, the
teachers are entitled to their salaries for the time school is thus
closed unless it is specifically provided otherwise in the contract." The courts go upon the basis that as one contracts, so
is he bound, and that the teachers did not bring on this misfortune, that is if the school authorities had desired to be relieved
of the obligation of paying teachers while school was closed because of the prevalence of disease, they could have, and should
have, inserted in the contract a stipulation to that effect. loreover, the Courts go further, and hold that closing the schools
in such cases does not constitute impossibility of performance
within the contemplation of the law, but results from mere
necessity or expediency. McKay v. Barnett,9 a Utah case decided in 1900, illustrates the reasoning of the Courts. In that
3Williston

cited.4

on Contracts, Impossibility, Section 1936 and cases

Ibid., Section 1938 and cases cited.
Section 1940 and cases cited.
Ibid., Section 1946 and cases cited.
Williston on Contracts, Impossibility, Section 1963
8 Dewey v. Union School District of the City of Alpena, 43 Mich.
480, 5 N. W. 646 (1880); Libby v. Inhabitants of Douglas, 175 Mass.
128, 55 N. E. 808 (1900); McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah 239, 60 Pac. 1100
(1900); Smith v. School District No. 64 of Marion County, 89 Kan. 225,
131 Pac. 557 (1913); Holter, Appellant v. School District of Patton, 73
Pa. 9Superior Court 14 (1919).
Supra, note 8.
5
1Ibid.,
6
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case the schools were closed for sixteen days by the school board
because of smallpox. In holding that the teacher could recover
for that time, the court used this emphatic language: "Where
the contract is to do acts which can be performed, nothing but
the act of God, or of the public enemy, or the interdiction of
the law as a direct and sole cause of the failure will excuse performance. This principle is elementary. The schools were not
closed for any such reason by the board of education. While the
closing of the schools may have been wise and prudent, the
closing was not due to any cause which made it impossible for
the schools to keep open. The board of education might have
stipulated that the plaintiff should have no compensation during the time the school be closed on account of the prevalence
of contagious diseases, but not having done so, it cannot deny
the compensation during such time on account of the prevalence
of smallpox." The court in the Libby case 10 enunciated that "the
prevalence of disease made the keeping open of school unwise,
but not impossible". The other cases cited, based upon facts
ciusdcm generis, hold that teachers can recover. No cases have
been found contra.
No Kentucky cases have been reported involving this phase
of contract law. But the writer submits that Kentucky would
follow the other states, and would allow the teachers to recover
their salaries for the time school was closed. When the school
board closes school because of contagion in the school district
this does not create an impossibility of performance on the part
of the school board. True, the welfare of the community dictates that school should be closed. But this is expediency
rather than impossibility, and is not sufficient to exonerate the
school authorities from liability on their contract. Besides, the
teacher is not to blame. The school board could have relieved
itself of liability had it thought fit by providing against liability
in case of such contingencies. No fraud or sharp practice was
used by the teacher in securing his contract. The contract calls
for a definite term at a stated salary. If a misfortune befalls the
district so that school must be closed, it would seem that the
district should bear the burden. It assumed the risk that school
should be kept open during the entire term by implication. To
hold the district or school board liable in such instance would
"'Libby v. Inhabitants of Douglas, supra, note S.
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be in accord with sound principles of contract law. The same
rule should be applied if the school board closed the school because of extreme weather in the winter months, such as was
witnessed in Kentucky during the winter of 1935.
2. Suppose the schools were closed by order of the health
authorities because of an epidemic, rather than by order of the
school authorities. What rights has the teacher to his salary
in this case?
The Courts are divided upon this point. One line of decisions holds that where school is closed by the health authorities acting under statutory authority the teacher cannot recover
salary for the time school is closed. The Courts upholding this
view reason that here is a case of real impossibility within the
contemplation of the law, since the school authorities are prevented from carrying out their part of the contract by operation of law.1 1 The Court in the Howard case, 12 in holding that
the teacher could not recover, had this to say: "It is not claimed
that the board of health did not have authority to close the
school, or that the order was illegal in any respect. This being
so, that order, so long as it remained in force was a valid legal
prohibition against the continuance of the school, and the district by the force of law was unable to complete its contract.
Had the board of health failed to act, and had the school been
closed by the district on its own motion, then the rule contended
for (that the district was not relieved from liability on its contract) might be invoked. But the action of the district in closing
the school was not voluntary. It was the act of the law, which
The
the district and all others were compelled to obey."
13
course
Hinshaw case contains language of like import. In the
of the opinion this significant expression fell from the Court:
"It was in the exercise of the police power which had been delegated to it by statute that the health officials closed the school
here involved, and such act was independent of the authority of
the township trustee, and entirely beyond his control. The law
delegating this authority to the board of health was in force
when the contract here involved was entered into .... The law
n School District No. 16 of Sherman County v. Howard, 5 Neb.
(Unof.) 340, 98 N. W. 666 (1904); Gregg School Township v. Hinshaw, 76 Ind. App. 503, 132 N. E. 586, 17 A. L. R. 1222 (1921).
SSupra, note 11.
SSupra, note 11.
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of the land is a part of every contract. It is the rule that when
the performance of a contract becomes impossible, non-performance is excused, and no damages can be recovered. After the
contract was entered into, and when the exigency arose, the
health board in the exercise of the police power delegated to it,
closed the school, and the contract for the time that the order
was in force was impossible of performance, and hence unenforceable, and there can be no recovery for such time." Thus we
see that these jurisdictions have determined in no uncertain
terms that when school is closed by the health officers acting in
pursuance of law in the exercise of the police power delegated
to them, because of an epidemic, the teacher cannot recover for
such time because of impossibility of performance on the part of
the school boards. Performance of the contract with the teacher
in contravention to the order of the board of health would be
a violation of the law by the school authorities and when such
isthe case performance of contract is excused pro tanto.
On the other hand, however, there is an array of authority
which holds that the teacher is entitled to recover for the time
school is closed, even though it may have been closed by order of
the health officers, or pursuant to such order. 14 But upon analysis
and mature reflection it will be seen that most of these decisions
resulted from peculiar circumstances in the factual set-up. For
example, in the Sanders and Coutch cases, although school was
closed by order of the board of health, in each instance the
teach ers were iNstrtcted by the school authorities to hold themselves in readiness to resume work when the schools could be
opened, which might occur at any time..The Courts correctly
decided the cases in allowing the teachers to recover for the
time while school was closed. To the same effect is a recent
Ohio case, 15 wherein the plaintiff had been employed by the
school board to transport pupils to and from school. The health
11Gear, et al. v. Gray, 10 Ind. App. 428, 37 N. B. 1059 (1894);
Randolph v. Sanders, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 331, 54 S. W. 621 (1899); Board
of Education of City of Hugo, Chocton County v. Couch, 63 Okla. 65,
162 Pac. 585 (1917); Montgomery v. Board of Education of Liberty
T. P., Union County, 102 Ohio State 189, 131 N. E. 497 (1921); Phelps
v. School District No. 109, Wayne County, 302 Ill.
193, 134 N. E. 312
(1922); Crane v. School District No. 14 of Tillamook County, 188 Pac.
712 (1920).
'- Montgomery v. Board of Education of Liberty Township, 102
Ohio State 189, 131 N. E. 497 (1921).
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board closed the schools, but at the same time the plaintiff was
instructed by the school officials to continue ready to begin work
again -when the school could be opened. Although the plaintiff
was not a teacher, the Court applied the same rule and allowed
the plaintiff to recover.
It is not difficult to follow the Courts in the cases just alluded to. Certainly when the school officials ordered the teachers to hold themselves in readiness to resume work, and to hold
themselves thus even while school was closed, this signified that
they treated the contracts with the teachers as still being in
force; and if the teachers remained ready to resume work when
called upon, at the instance of the school boards such school
boards in justice ought to be required to pay the teachers' salaries while school was closed. Now can it be doubted after reading the cases just referred to that the mandate of the school authorities requiring the plaintiffs to hold themselves in readiness
to resume work as soon as the schools could be opened, which
might have been any day, had considerable weight with the
court in allowing recovery in favor of the teachers? In the
Crane case, 16 where the schools were closed in pursuance of an
order by the health officers, the court allowed recovery in favor
of the teacher for the time school was closed, but specifically held
that quarantine laws applied only to individuals and not to the
public at large, and that the health authorities had no right
under the law to close the schools. This decision then is easy
to comprehend. If the school board stopped performance of its
contract in obedience to an order of the health officers who had
no authority to close the schools, certainly the school board could
not plead impossibility of performance because of the operation
of the law. This was the position taken by the court.
The Gear case 17 is also capable of explanation. There the
health board temporarily closed the schools because of contagion.
The court allowed recovery for such time in favor of the teacher.
But nowhere did the school board interpose the defense that it
was prevented from carrying out its contract by operation of
the law. Its sole defense was that its contract was impossible of
performance during the time in question because of an act of
God. And the court was right in determining that closing the
"Supra, note 14.

:LTId.

RIGHTS OF TEACHER wHEN SCHOOL IS CLOSED

schools was not the result of an act of God within the contemplation of the law, and that it was only a misfortune which the
district must bear, since it did not provide against such contingence in the contract. This view is in exact accord with the
cases cited in footnote 8, supra, where the schools were closed
by the school boards themselves, and which allowed the teachers
to recover since no provision was inserted in the contract against
recovery in case such contingencies as epidemics arose. The
Court in the Gear case under discussion was not required to go
beyond the pleadings and decide the case upon another ground
not relied upon by the defendant. Moreover, the Court placed
emphasis upon the fact that the plaintiff teacher was able and
willing to teach during all the time specified in the contract and
said that there was nothing to show in the evidence that the
teacher was not bound to hold herself in readiness to teach whenever called upon to resume her duties. Doubtless these aspects
of the pleadings and evidence influenced the court in its decision. But it is quite reasonable to surmise that the court would
have disallowed recovery if the defense had been impossibility
because of the operation of the law through the order of the
board of health, rather than the defense of an act of God which
was quite ill-conceived.
The Phelps case,' 8 however, is a little unusual. The health
board ordered school closed because of an epidemic of influenza.
While in the course of the opinion the court says, that the performance of the contract, valid when made, was rendered impossible by the happening of a contingency which could not be
foreseen or, known when the contract was made, yet it held in
favor of the teacher simply because the school board- did not expressly provide against such contingency in the contract. Moreover, throughout the opinion the court discussed cases wherein
the schools had been closed by the school authorities themselves,
and continuing, made this statement: "whether the school authorities took the initiative in closing the school, or whether it
was done by action of the board of health does not alter the
rights of the parties to the contract." The reasoning of the
court in this case seems fallacious. The court says that performance of the contract by the school board became impossible. Yet
the court held the board liable simply because it did not provide
I1Id.
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against such impossibility in the contract. In this the court
was in error. It is well settled that where a contract becomes
impossible of performance by operation of the law, the contracting parties are discharged from liability unless there is an
express stipidation in the contract whereby the promisor absolutely assumes the risk of impossibility. In the absence of such
stipulation impossibility relieves the parties of their obligations
under the contract. This is different from the cases of hardship or inconvenience. To be relieved of liability in these cases
there must be a provision in the contract to that effect. Not so
where there is real impossibility created by operation of the
law. The law will not enforce a contract which the law itself
has made impossible of performance; and there is such impossibility when to perform would be to violate the law. This principle is so elementary that we need not cite authorities to sustain
it. Moreover, the court is clearly wrong when it says that the
same result should be reached regardless of whether the schools
were closed by the school authorities or by the board of health.
When the school officials close the schools of their own accord
we cannot say that the contract is impossible of performance
because of the commands of the law. But when the health board,
clothed with full authority under the police power, orders the
schools closed, there is nothing left for the school officials to do
but comply with the order. All the other courts before whom
this question has been have drawn this distinction, and have
allowed recovery when the schools were closed by the school
authorities themselves, 19 and other courts have disallowed recovery in favor of the teachers when the schools were closed by
the board of health, saying that the contract was impossible of
performance temporarily, because of the operation of the law. 20
The court in the Phelps case under consideration erred in failing to make this distinction.
Notwithstanding the Phelps case the writer submits that it
does not represent the law. If school is closed because of contagious disease by order of the board of health acting with full
authority under the law, and if the school officials do not create
a continuing liability by instructing the teacher to hold himself
in readiness to resume work when school can be re-opened there
"Cases cited in footnote 8 supra.
2OCases cited in footnote 9 supra.

RIGHTS OF TEACHER WHEN SCHOOL IS CLOSED

should be no recovery in favor of the teacher for the time school
is thus closed. There is such impossibility as the law requires to
discharge the school board from liability, since to perform would
be to violate the law. It matters not that the school board
failed to provide against an impossibility created by the law itself in the contract.
3. Suppose the school house is burned or otherwise destroyed before the term ends and the school board refuses or
fails to provide another building. Can the teacher recover for
the remaining part of the term ?
By the preponderant weight of authority the teachers in
such case can recover, unless the board of education has protected itself from liability by the terms of the contract. 21 The
courts supporting this view go upon the idea that burning the
building is not tantamount to an act of God, and that destruction of the building, while it may create an inconvenience to the
district, or work a hardship upon it, yet it does not render the
contract impossible of complete performance. It is always possible for the school board to re-build the school house or procure
a suitable building in the community so that it may fulfill the obligations of the contract with the teacher. School Directors v.
(!j'.ws 22 aptly expressed the majority view. There the court
said, "The statute made it the duty of the school Directors to
maintain a school of at least five months in the year, and the destruction of the school house does not exonerate them from the
performance of this duty, as they can, in that event, rent a
suitable room for school purposes, and the fulfillment of the contract not being made impossible by the act of God, they must be
held bound by its terms, as mere hardship or difficulty will not
suffice to excuse them." Judgment was rightly rendered for the
teacher's salary for nearly four months, which part of the school
year remained when the school house was destroyed by fire.
The only case which has been found denying recovery in
favor of the teacher upon destruction of the school building
' Cashen v. School District No. 12, 50 Vt. 30 (1877); Smith v.
School District No. 2 of Pleasant Plains, 69 Mich. 589, 37 N. W. 567
(18S8); School Directors v. Scott Crews, 23 Ill. App. 367 (1887); The
Charlestown School Township v. Hog, 74 Ind. 127 (1881); Corn v.
Board of Education, 39 Ill. App. 446 (1891); Clune v. School District
No. 3 of the Town of Buchanon, 166 Mich. 452, 166 N. W. 11 (1918);
24 R. C. L. Sec. 619-620.
- Sztpra, note 21.
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comes from Mlissouri. 23 The teacher there had a contract to
teach four months. When he had taught two months and fifteen
days the school house burned. The statute authorized the payment of teachers' salaries only upon the filing of monthly reports.
No reports were made by the teacher after the school house was
destroyed. In holding that the teacher could not recover the
court partially based its decision upon the failure of the teacher
to file monthly reports after the burning of the school building;
but the principal reason for disallowing recovery by the teacher
is best detailed in the court's own language. Said the court:
"The plaintiff in the present case was employed to teach the
school of the defenadnt school district for a period of four
months. That is to say, he was employed to teach for such
period a school in the school house then owned by the defendant.
. . . We are satisfied that in the contract the condition 'if the
school house should continue to exist for such period of time'
should be implied.... The burning of the school house during
the school term stopped the defendant's liability pro tanto."
The above decision from Missouri appears to be unsound.
The court partly decided the case because no monthly reports
were filed by the teacher after the school house burned. But
could not the court have just as well determined that the reports
required by the statute were reports of attendance under normal
circumstances when there were pupils in attendance? The
school officials knew that the school house had been destroyed,
and to require the teacher thereafter to file mere blank monthly
reports would have been to require a vain and futile thing.
Doubtless when the Legislature framed the Statute requiring
reports to be filed by teachers, such conditions as existed in the
case at bar were not within its contemplation. The court's
reasoning on this point lacks profundity. Continuing, the Missouri court goes off on a tangent when it says that the parties
contracted that school should be taught in a particular house for
the entire term. And the court deviated further when it inserted
of its own motion the condition "if the school house should continue to exist for so long a term." Here, the court in actuality
remade the contract for the parties. Nothing was said in the
contract as made by the contracting parties that any particular
house should be used. The plainiff was hired to teach in a parOHall v. School District, 24 Mo. App. 213 (1887).
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ticidar district, not in a particular house. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the parties contemplated when the contract was made
the continued existence of the school house then standing, as the
court intimates. On the other hand it could have been within
their contemplation that if this school house were destroyed another would be built or furnished by the school authorities so
the teacher could teach a full term for the benefit of the taxpayers' children. Throughout the opinion the court indulges in
technicalities, and implied conditions in the contract which are
unwarranted. It is remarkable that no other state has adopted
the rule enunciated by the Missouri court. Perhaps this decision is just another anomaly in the law.
Three Kentucky cases have been found involving our problem. While these decisions disallowed recovery in favor of the
teacher peculiar circumstances in the factual set-up were responsible for the results reached. And the import of these Kentucky decisions is that Kentucky follows the majority view, and
would allow the teacher to recover his salary if the school board
failed to furnish another building after the original school house
burned. In the first Kentucky case, 24 while there is dictum to
the effect that school funds can be paid out only when the school
is legally taught, yet the basis of the decision was that the teacher
sued the wrong party in suing the Superintendent rather than
the school board. The court specifically declared that it was the
County board's duty to provide another school building, and
that if the teacher had a cause of action it was against the board,
and not against the Superintendent. The court rightly held
that the teacher had no cause of action as to the Superinendent,
inasmuch as the teacher's contract was with the board of
education.
The dictum in the Vaughn case just cited to the effect that
school funds can be paid out to teachers only when school is
legally taught is completely negatived by a later Kentucky case
decided in 1912.25 In this case the school building burned and
the teacher rented another of her own accord. She was not requested to do this by the school authorities, nor did she consult
21Vaughn v. Hindman, Superintendent of School, 145 Ky. 507, 140
S. W. 641 (1911).
z Noble, et al. v. Williams, et al., 150 Ky. 439, 150 S. W. 507
(1912).
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them about doing so. She paid the rent herself, and later sued
to recover the money so expended. The court was right in holding that the school board was not liable since the teacher acted
the part of a volunteer in paying the rent in the first instance.
But as bearing upon whether the teacher could have recovered
her salary in case no other building had been furnished by the
school board this significant expression fell from the court:
"The teachers had their teaching contracts; and if the board
made it impossible to teach by failing to furnish a place for
conducting the school, they had their right of action on their
contracts, subject to customary principles involved in such
cases."
The direct tenor of this language is that the teacher was
under no duty to provide a building in which to teach after the
first one burned, and that if the school board whose duty it was
to furnish such building had been derelict in that respect, the
teacher could have sued the board on her contract for the salary
for the remainder of the term.
Another Kentucky case, 26 decided in 1929, supports the majority view. In this case the school house burned. The school
board upon consideration determined that another suitable building could not be procured in the community, and that it was too
late to build a new one. Thereupon the board discontinued the
school service in that district for the rest of the term. The
teacher did not try to find other employment as a teacher of
similar rank, in the county, with a view to mitigating the damages, and when she sued the school board for her salary, the court
held that she could not recover. The Court in this ease applied
an elementary principle of contract law, and recovery was properly disallowed; for it is well settled that when an employer
wrongfully terminates a contract for personal service it is the imperative duty of the employee to minimize the damages by finding, or at least seeking to find another position of similar rank in
the locality. This the teacher here failed to do; and in thus failing to comply with the demands of contract law she lost a perfectly good cause of action. In the course of the opinion the
court said: "But if such be the result, without his fault, and in
spite of reasonable effort to find work, he may recover the whole
26Abrams v. Jackson County Board of Education, 230 Ky. 151, 18
S. W. (2d) 1000 (1929).
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contract price, provided he alleges and proves that state of
case." Thus we see that the court denied recovery in this case
not because the teacher had no cause of action but because she
failed to follow the customary principles of contract law in regard to mitigation of damages. In fact the court plainly says
that if the teacher had done her part toward minimizing the
damages after the breach of contract by the board recovery of
her salary for the remainder of the term would have been
decreed.
Thus Kentucky follows the other states, save Missouri alone,
and would allow a teacher to recover salary under her contract
for the time school is closed because of destruction of the school
building, provided that the contract contains no stipulation
against such recovery, and provided also that the teacher does
her duty in trying to find other similar employment in the
county in mitigation of damages.
This position is in accord with sound principles of contract
law. Such contingency as destruction of the school building is
not provided against in the contract. The contract is not impossible to perform, nor was destruction of the building, such
an act of God as will excuse performance within the eyes of the
law. It is the statutory duty of a school board to furnish school
buildings so that it may be possible for teachers to carry out
their part of the contract. Burning of the school house is merely
a misfortune which must be borne by one of the parties to the
contract. If the teacher continues ready to perform, and in
the meantime has tried to mitigate the damages of the district
by seeking after employment the school board should be held
liable for the teacher's salary under its unconditional contract,
since it could have relieved itself of liability by replacing the
school building, or by stipulation in the contract with the teacher
against recovery in case the school house should be destroyed.
Without doubt this is the law, Mlissouri being the only exception.
TowN, HALL.

